讲座时间：2025年9月17日9:30-11:30

地点：邵逸夫科学馆206第六会议室

题目：MATCHING AND PRICE COMPETITION IN LARGE MARKETS

内容摘要

This paper studies the large market implications of impersonal wage competition. In a setting where there are finitely many categories of firms and workers, and firms compete for workers by offering wages, we characterize the unique mixed strategy equilibrium when the market size is large via replication of types. Competition in equilibrium is local: firms only compete against others like themselves, either within the same category or one category above. We also establish the rate of convergence of the equilibrium to the firm-optimal competitive equilibrium. In particular, wage suppression, which is a consequence of efficiency loss instead of market power, quickly disappears when the number of firms and workers in each category increases.

专家简介

皇甫秉超，美国罗切斯特大学经济学博士，南京审计大学助理教授，主要从事博弈论、信息经济学、微观经济理论研究，论文发表于Journal of Economic Theory, American Economic Journal：Microeconomics, International Journal of Game Theory，Economic Theory Bulletin, International Game Theory Review, 金融研究等国内外期刊，主持一项国家自然科学基金面上项目。