Research of Institutional Economics, Vol.26 (No. 4 2009)-山东大学经济研究院
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Research of Institutional Economics, Vol.26 (No. 4 2009)
Updat:Nov 24, 2009   Author:Jack   Click:[]

Research of Institutional Economics, Vol.26 (No. 4 2009)

Title; Author(s); Abstract; Key Words; JEL Classifications

1. Title: Based on the Inequality Resource Endowment

Author(s):Wang Linhui Dong Zhiqing Zhang Yishan

Abstract:The paper uses the inequality resource endowment and the status of economic to deduct the institution equilibrium. Using the logic of play game of Schotter(1981), the paper points out that: the institution equilibrium and institution structure is lied on the resource structure of the player. In the process of real economic growth and institution equilibrium, the resource structure makes the institution not neutral and not equal and the equilibrium institution not efficient. Whether institution is efficient or not depends on the consistency of the direction of economic efficiency with the goal of controlling player. The institution equilibrium is dynamic. Only if the variety of the player’s resource comes to a critical value, the equilibrium will be broken to form the new equilibrium.

Key Words:Resource Endowment; Institution Equilibrium; Institution Efficiency

JEL ClassificationsP00 P26 P48

2. Title: The Economical Analyses of Patent Enforcement Rate and its Influential Factors

Author(s):Feng Jinhua Huang Shaoan

Abstract:While people were paying much more attention on the applied patent quantity, many of them have neglected patent enforcement rate。In this article, we first state the difference between China and developed countries’ patent enforcement rate. Then, we construct a model based on the simplest case according to nordhaus’s invention possibility equation and get the profit-maximize patent enforcement rate. We went on the analysis of the model on more difficult cases and analyzed the influential factors. At last, we brought out the solutions to these problems.

Key words: patent patent enforcement rate

JEL Classifications:O34

3. Title: Specific Performance, Expected Damages and Optimal Breach Remedies

Author(s):Yang zhili

Abstract:The remedies of contract breach aim at maximizing contracts total surplus and promoting social welfare. As main measures of breach remedies like specific performance and expected damages have equal status with other. Specific performance and expected damages are no difference in inducing efficient investment and realizing parties’ maximization of profits. They are also no difference in transaction costs. They are notoptimal Breach Remedies in providing optimal investment and reducing transaction costs. The choice of remedies measures should respect the choice of the parties. The provision of China's Contract Law on specific performance indicates the principle of contract freedom and respects the parties’ choice.

Keywords:Specific Performance, Expected Damages, Law and Economics

JEL ClassificationsK12

4. Title: An Option with Disclosure Duty Rule to Remedies for Breach of Contract

Author(s):Hu Weiqiang

Abstract: Specific performance and compensatory damages are the two most common default remedy rules for breach of contract in contract law. However, when each one applies alone, some efficiency loss will occur. This paper tries to solve it by designing a mechanism through which one party to the contract can opt for one remedy under some circumstances such that different types of creditors can be distinguished ex ante on the one hand, debtors can also take proper level of precaution on the other hand. Eventually, efficient breach can be much more satisfied.

Last:Research of Institutional Economics, Vol.27 (No. 1 2010) Next:Titles and Abstracts of volume 19

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